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NOTE 
STANDING COMMITTEE ON DISCIPLINE v. 
YAGMAN: THE NINTH CIRCUIT PROVIDES 
SUBSTANTIAL FIRST AMENDMENT 
PROTECTION FOR ATTORNEY CRITICISM 
OF THE JUDICIARY 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Standing Committee on Discipline of the United States 
District Court for the Central District of California v. Yagman, 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that an attorney who 
publicly criticized a federal judge did not commit sanctionable 
conduct. l In determining whether the attorney, Stephen 
Yagman, had violated a local rule of professional conduct for 
lawyers, the court applied a "reasonable attorney" standard, 
rather than a subjective malice standard.2 The court held that 
Yagman's statements, in light of this higher standard, did not 
violate the rule's prohibition against impugning the integrity of 
the court.3 The Ninth Circuit also held that the attorney's 
statements did not violate the rule's prohibition against attor-
neys interfering with the administration of justice.4 In finding 
no interference with the administration of justice the Ninth 
Circuit announced a new standard. Under this new standard 
the attorney's conduct must pose a "clear and present danger" 
1. Standing Comm. on Discipline of the U.S. Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist. 
of Cal. v. Yagman, 55 F.3d 1430 (9th Cir. 1995) (hereinafter "Yagman") (opinion 
by Kozinski, J., joined by Thompson, J.; dissent by Wiggins, J.). 
2. See id. at 1437; see infra text accompanying notes 66-71. 
3. Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1438-42. 




Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1996
116 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:115 
to the administration of justice to be sanctionable.5 This note 
examines the Ninth Circuit's analysis of Yagman's statements 
and questions whether the newly-created "clear and present 
danger" standard is stringent enough to prevent attorneys 
from forum shopping. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit reversed 
the holding of the district court.s 
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
In 1991, Los Angeles-based civil rights attorney Stephen 
Yagman filed a lawsuit in which he was the party plaintiff 
against several insurance companies.7 The case was assigned 
to Judge Manuel Real, who was Chief Judge of the Central 
District of California at that time.s Yagman subsequently filed 
a motion to disqualify Judge Real on grounds of bias.9 The 
motion was randomly assigned to Judge William Keller.lO 
Judge Keller denied the motionll and issued an Order to 
Show Cause why Yagman should not be sanctioned for failing 
to notify the judge that another court had previously rejected 
an attempt by Yagman to disqualify Judge Real. 12 On May 31, 
1991, Judge Keller filed an order in which he found Yagman in 
5. Id. at 1443. 
6. Id. at 1445. 
7. Standing Comm. on Discipline of the U.S. Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist. 
of Cal. v. Yagman, 856 F. Supp. 1384, 1385 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (hereinafter "Stand-
ing Comm."); Standing Comm. on Discipline of the U.S. Dist. Court for the Cent. 
Dist. of Cal. v. Yagman, 55 F.3d 1430, 1433 (9th Cir. 1995). 
8. Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1433. 
9. Id. Yagman based his claim of bias on an earlier case in which Judge Real 
granted a directed verdict for Yagman's opponents and sanctioned Yagman person-
ally in the amount of $250,000. Id. at 1434 n.1. The Ninth Circuit reversed the 
sanctions and remanded the case for assignment to another judge. Id. (citing In re 
Yagman, 796 F.2d 1165, 1188 (9th Cir. 1986)). The court found no evidence that 
Judge Real held any personal animosity toward Yagman, but reassigned the case 
"to preserve the appearance of justice." Id. On remand, Judge Real challenged the 
Ninth Circuit's authority to reassign the case. Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1434 n.1. 
Yagman then petitioned for, and was granted, a writ of mandamus. The dispute 
came to an end when the U.S. Supreme Court denied Judge Real's petition for 
certiorari. Id. (citing Real v. Yagman, 484 U.S. 963 (1987)). 
10. Id. at 1433-34 (citing Yagman v. Republic Ins., 137 F.R.D. 652, 657-58 
(C.D. Cal. 1991)). 
11. Id. On appeal, Judge Keller's denial of the disqualification order was af-
firmed. Id. at 1434 n.2 (citing Yagman v. Republic Ins., 987 F.2d 622 (9th Cir. 
1993)). 
12. Standing Comm., 856 F. Supp. at 1385. 
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violation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11/3 18 U.S.C. 
section 401(3)14 and the inherent authority of the COurt. 15 
A week after Judge Keller issued his sanctions order, the 
Los Angeles Daily Journal quoted Yagman as stating that 
Judge Keller "has a penchant for sanctioning Jewish lawyers: 
me, David Kenner and Hugh Manes. I find this to be evidence 
of anti-Semitism."16 The district court also found that Yagman 
accused Judged Keller of being "drunk on the bench," although 
the Daily Journal article did not publish this charge. 17 
Around the time that the Daily Journal published the 
article, Prentice Hall, publisher of the Almanac of the Federal 
Judiciary, requested comments from Yagman for a profile of 
13. Id. (citing Republic Ins., 137 F.R.D. 310 (C.D. Cal. 1991». As a basis for 
the recusal motion, Yagman relied on Real v. Yagman, characterized in his moving 
papers as a case in which "Judge Real sued me personally." Republic Insurance, 
137 F.R.D. at 314. Judge Keller found this characterization to be "grossly negli-
gent." Id. The judge held that Yagman's attempt to use that case as a basis for 
recusal was not "to the best of Yagman's knowledge, information and belief, 
formed after a reasonable inquiry, well grounded in fact and warranted by existing 
law or good faith extension thereof," in violation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
11.Id. 
14. The statute reads: "A court of the United States shall have power to pun-
ish by fine or imprisonment, at its discretion, such contempt of its authority, and 
none other, as . . . (3) Disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, 
rule, decree, or command." 18 U.S.C. § 40l. 
15. Standing Comm., 856 F. Supp. at 1385. In the sanctions order, Judge 
Keller stated that Yagman was being sanctioned for pursuing the matter in an 
"improper and frivolous manner." Republic Ins., 137 F.R.D. at 312. The order 
sharply reprimanded Yagman, further stating that "neither monetary sanctions nor 
suspension appear to be effective in deterring Yagman's pestiferous conduct." 
Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1434 n.2 (citing Republic Insurance, 137 F.R.D. at 318). The 
order also recommended that Yagman be "disciplined appropriately" by the Califor-
nia State Bar. Id. (citing Republic Insurance, 137 F.R.D. at 319). On appeal, the 
Ninth Circuit reversed the sanctions but affirmed the denial of the disqualification. 
Id. (citing Yagman v. Republic Ins., 987 F.2d 622 (9th Cir. 1993». 
16. Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1434 (citing Susan Seager, Judge Sanctions Yagman, 
Refers Case to State Bar, L.A. DAILY JOURNAL, June 6, 1991, at 1). 
17. Id. at 1434 (citing Standing Comm., 856 F. Supp. at 1386). 
3
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Judge Keller. is Yagman responded with a letter to Prentice 
Hall in which he offered scathing criticism of the judge.19 
In June of 1991, Yagman's law firm placed a half-page 
advertisement in the Los Angeles Daily Journal asking attor-
neys who had been sanctioned by Judge Keller to contact the 
law firm.20 Approximately a month and a half later, Yagman 
spoke with attorney Robert Steinberg in a Los Angeles court-
house hallway.2i The district court panel believed Steinberg's 
claim that, at this time, Yagman told Steinberg that he public-
ly criticized Judge Keller in hopes of getting the judge to re-
cuse himself in future cases.22 Steinberg, believing Yagman 
18. Id. at 1434. The Almanac profiles federal judges, covering their back-
grounds, noteworthy rulings and other items of interest. Id. at 1434 n.3. One 
section titled "Lawyers' Evaluation" publishes anonymous attorneys' comments 
which sometimes contain harsh criticism. Judges who believe the comments pub-
lished in the "Lawyers' Evaluation" do not fairly represent their performance on 
the bench sometimes ask Prentice Hall to elicit additional comments from attor-
neys. Prentice Hall sent a letter to Yagman following such a request from Judge 
Keller. Id. 
19. See Standing Comm., 856 F. Supp. at 1386. In his letter, Yagman claimed 
that Judge Keller had sanctioned or sought to sanction three Jewish attorneys, 
including Yagman. Id. The letter further stated: 
It is outrageous that the Judge wants his profile redone 
because he thinks it to be inaccurately harsh in portray-
ing him in a poor light. It is an understatement to char-
acterize the judge as "the worst judge in the central dis-
trict." It would be fairer to say that he is ignorant, dis-
honest, ill-tempered, and a bully, and probably is one of 
the worst judges in the United States. If television camer-
as were permitted in his courtroom, the other federal 
judges in the country would be so embarrassed by this 
buffoon that they would run for cover. One might believe 
that some of the reason for this sub-standard human is 
the recent acrimonious divorce through which he recently 
went: but talking to attorneys who knew him years ago 
indicates that, if anything, he has mellowed. One other 
comment: his girlfriend is, or was, the newly-appointed 
U.S. Attorney in Los Angeles, Lourdes Baird, who, like 
the judge, is a right wing fanatic. 
Id. The district court also found that Yagman sent a copy of the letter to Judge 
Keller. Id. 
20. Id. The advertisement read: "This office is gathering evidence concerning 
sanctions imposed by U.S. Dist. Judge William D. Keller. It would be appreciated 
if any attorney who has been sanctioned, or threatened with sanctions by Judge 
Keller fill out the form below and mail it to us. Thank you." Yagman, 55 F.3d at 
1434 n.5. 
21. Standing Comm., 856 F. Supp. at 1386-87. 
22. Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1434; See also Standing Comm., 856 F. Supp. at 1392. 
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had committed misconduct, wrote a letter to the Standing 
Committee on Discipline which described his conversation with 
Yagman.23 
In September of 1991, Judge Keller wrote a letter to the 
Standing Committee which formally referred Yagman's conduct 
for disciplinary action, pursuant to the local rules of attorney 
professional conduct.24 The letter described Yagman's anti-
Semitism charge, the comments he made to Prentice Hall pub-
lishing, and Yagman's firm's advertisement in the Los Angeles 
Daily Journal. 25 
The Standing Committee investigated the charges de-
scribed by Steinberg and Judge Keller, and, in October of 1992, 
filed a Petition for Issuance of an Order to Show Cause why 
Yagman should not be suspended from practice or otherwise 
disciplined under Local Rule 2.6.4.26 Pursuant to this rule, the 
matter was assigned to a panel of three Central District judg-
Yagman strongly denied saying this to Steinberg. Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1434 n.6. 
23. Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1434. 
24. Id. at 1435. Federal Local Court Rule for the Central District of California 
(Civil) section 2.6.3.1 provides, in pertinent part: 
Role of the Standing Committee on Discipline. The Stand-
ing Committee on Discipline shall investigate any charge 
or information, whether referred by one of the judges or 
otherwise coming to its attention, that any attorney has 
been guilty of unprofessional conduct or has violated the 
Rules of Professional Conduct of the State Bar of Califor-
nia. 
Fed Local Ct Rules, CD Cal Rule 2.6.3.1 
Id. 
25. Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1435. In his letter, Judge Keller stated: 
26. Id. 
Mr. Yagman's campaign of harassment and intimidation 
challenges the integrity of the judicial system. Moreover, 
there is clear evidence that Mr. Yagman's attacks upon 
me are motivated by his desire to create a basis for re-
cusing me in any future proceeding. . . . The Standing 
Committee on Discipline should take action to protect the 
court from further abuse. 
5
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es.27 The panel subsequently reissued an Order to Show 
Cause and scheduled a hearing on the matter.2S 
The hearing lasted two days, during which time both the 
Standing Committee and Yagman presented evidence.29 After 
reviewing the evidence and the written arguments of the par-
ties, the panel found that Yagman violated two separate prohi-
bitions of Local Rule 2.5.2.30 First, the panel held that certain 
of Yagman's criticisms constituted conduct which "degrades or 
impugns the integrity of the Court."31 Second, it found that 
Yagman violated the Rule's prohibition against "engag[ing] in 
any conduct . . . which interferes with the administration of 
justice.,,32 After reviewing arguments regarding the appropri-
ate sanction, the panel suspended Yagman from practice before 
the United States District Court for the Central District of 
California for a period of two years.33 Yagman appealed the 
panel's decision to the Ninth Circuit.34 
III. BACKGROUND 
A. THE POLICY BEHIND REGULATING ATTORNEY SPEECH 
Regulation of attorney criticisms directed at the judiciary 
necessarily implicates First Amendment concerns.35 Because a 
27. 1d. Chief Judge Real originally referred the matter to Chief Circuit Judge 
Clifford J. Wallace for assignment to a panel of three judges from outside the 
Central District. Standing Comm., 856 F. Supp. at 1387. After Yagman argued 
that this assignment violated Local Rule 2.6.4, the matter was referred back to 
Chief Judge Real, who assigned it to Central District Judges Rafeedie, Davies and 
Williams. Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1435 n.7. 
28. Standing Comm., 856 F. Supp. at 1387. 
29. Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1435. Prior to the hearing, and on appeal, Yagman 
made several objections to the district court proceedings. First, he raised First 
Amendment objections to being disciplined for his statements regarding Judge 
Keller. Though both sides requested the opportunity to brief the issue, the panel 
did not act on these requests. The parties were thus forced to proceed without 
knowing the allocation of the burden of proof or the legal standard the court in-
tended to use. 1d. 
30. Standing Comm., 856 F. Supp. at 1385. 
31. 1d. 
32. 1d. 
33. 1d. at 1400. 
34. See Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1433. 
35. See id. at 1437-38, referring to Oklahoma ex reI. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. 
Porter, 766 P.2d 958, 966 (Okla. 1988). 
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major purpose of the First Amendment is to protect the free 
discussion of governmental affairs,36 regulation of criticism 
which is directed at a governmental unit strikes at the center 
of First Amendment freedoms.37 In addition to the speaker's 
right to communicate, the First Amendment inquiry takes into 
account the right of the listener to receive information.3s Fore-
closing an individual's right to hear an attorney's criticism of 
the judiciary prevents the public from receiving information on 
the judicial process from those who are intimately familiar 
with this branch of government.39 
Weighed against the attorney's right to criticize the judi-
ciary is the societal interest in maintaining public confidence 
in the judicial system:o In United States District Court v. 
Sandlin,'u the Ninth Circuit struck a constitutionally permis-
sible balance between these competing interests by holding 
that attorneys may freely criticize the judiciary if these criti-
cisms are supported by a reasonable factual basis.42 So long 
as these criticisms have such support, an attorney who voices 
them will not be subject to sanctions, even if the attorney is 
mistaken.43 
B. THE DISCIPLINARY PROCESS 
District courts possess the inherent power to discipline 
attorneys for unprofessional conduct in federal court.44 The 
standards of professional conduct for attorneys practicing in 
the Central District of California are set forth in the Federal 
Local Court Rules.45 The Central District provides a proce-
36. See Porter, 766 P.2d at 966-67. 
37.Id. 
38. Id. at 967. 
39. Id. 
40. Standing Comm. on Discipline of the U.S. Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist. 
of Cal. v. Yagman, 55 F.3d 1430, 1438 (9th Cir. 1995). 
41. 12 F.3d 861 (9th Cir. 1993). 
42. Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1438. 
43.Id. 
44. Standing Comm. on Discipline of the U.S. Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist. 
of Cal. v. Yagman, 856 F. Supp. 1384, 1387 (C.D. Cal 1994) (citing In re Yagman, 
803 F.2d 1085 (9th Cir. 1986) and Standing Comm. on Discipline of the U.S. Dist. 
Court for the Southern Dist. of Cal. v. Ross, 735 F.2d 1168, 1170 (9th. Cir. 1984), 
cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 469 U.S. 1081 (1984». 
45. Standing Comm., 856 F. Supp. at 1387 (referring to Local Rules 2.5, 2.5.1 
7
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dure by which judges and others in the legal community may 
refer unprofessional conduct to the Standing Committee on 
Discipline for investigation.46 If the Committee determines 
that the conduct merits discipline, it petitions for an Order to 
Show Cause why the attorney should not be subject to sanc-
tions.47 The case is then assigned to a panel of three judges, 
which holds a hearing in which the Committee acts as prosecu-
tor.48 
IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
In Standing Committee v. Yagman,49 the Ninth Circuit 
first rejected Yagman's contention that the composition of the 
Standing Committee denied him due process.50 The court fur-
ther held that his statements did not violate the prohibition 
contained in Local Rule 2.5.2, which bars statements that 
impugn the integrity of the court.51 The court also found that 
Yagman's conduct did not violate the rule's prohibition against 
interfering with the administration of justice.52 In determin-
ing whether Yagman violated either of the local rule's prohibi-
tions, the Ninth Circuit applied an objective "reasonable attor-
ney" standard, rather than the subjective malice standard 
typically used in defamation actions.53 
and 2.5.2.). 
46. Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1435 (citing Fed Local Ct Rules, CD Cal Rule 2.6.1 
and 2.6.3). The Standing Committee consists of twelve attorneys who are members 
of the bar of the court. Fed Local Ct Rules, CD Cal Rule 2.6.1. The Committee is 
divided into four sections. Id. at 2.6.3.2. When a charge is referred to the Commit-
tee, the chair assigns a section to investigate the matter. At the conclusion of the 
investigation, the section makes a recommendation to the Committee regarding 
whether the attorney's conduct merits sanctions. The full Committee may approve 
the recommendation by a majority vote or take other action it deems advisable, 
also by a majority vote. Id. at 2.6.3.3. 
47.Id. 
48. See Fed Local Ct Rules, CD Cal Rule 2.6.4. 
49. Standing Comm. on Discipline of the U.S. Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist. 
of Cal. v. Yagman, 55 F.3d 1430 (9th Cir. 1995). 
50. See id. at 1436. 
51. See id. at 1437-42. 
52. Id. at 1445. 
53. See id. at 1437. 
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A. THE MAKEUP OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE 
In his appeal to the Ninth Circuit, Yagman challenged the 
composition of the Standing Committee. 54 He claimed that 
several of its members had conflicts of interest that could have 
affected their decisions to seek disciplinary action against 
him.55 However, the court quickly rejected this due process 
claim, noting that none of the Standing Committee members 
represented Judge Keller, nor did the judge stand to benefit 
from any disciplinary action taken against Yagman.56 Absent 
a conflict of interest, the court found no other support for 
Yagman's due process claim. 57 
B. STATEMENTS WHICH IMPUGN THE INTEGRITY OF THE COURT 
In determining that Yagman's statements were protected 
by the First Amendment, the court first discussed the validity 
of Local Rule 2.5.2 and the legal standard to be used in decid-
ing whether Yagman's statements were sanctionable.58 In dis-
cussing the prohibition in Local Rule 2.5.2 against conduct 
which "impugns the integrity of the court," the Ninth Circuit 
relied on its opinion in Lewis v. Time, Inc.59 The Lewis court 
held that the First Amendment protects statements of opinion 
unless they imply a false assertion of fact.60 Applying Lewis, 
54. Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1435. 
55. Id. The Chairman of the Standing Committee represented Judge Real in 
Real v. Yagman, 484 U.S. 963 (1987) and was alleged by Yagman to have close 
personal ties to Judge Real. Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1435 n.9. Yagman also claimed 
that several of the other Committee members had opposed his clients in previous 
actions, either as defendants or opposing counsel. Id. 
56. Id. at 1436. 
57. Id. The court noted that the function of the Standing Committee is merely 
to assist the district court in upholding attorney disciplinary standards by reliev-
ing judges of the ungainly task of acting as both arbiters and prosecutors in disci-
plinary proceedings; the Standing Committee itself has no authority to impose 
sanctions. Id. In addition, the fact that the members of the Standing Committee 
are drawn from the Central District bar reflected a constitutionally sound judge-
ment that the benefits of having the prosecutorial body composed of peers of the 
attorney outweighs any potential loss of independence resulting from the Commit-
tee members' familiarity with the attorney subject to the proceedings. Yagman, 55 
F.3d at 1436 n.ll. 
58. See id. at 1436-38. 
59. Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1438 (citing Lewis v. Time Inc., 710 F.2d 549, 555 
(9th Cir. 1983». 
60. Id. (citing Lewis, 710 F.2d at 555 and Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 
9
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the court concluded that statements capable of being proved 
true or false which impugn the integrity of a judge may be the 
basis for sanctions.61 However, if the statements express an 
opinion based on fully stated facts they receive First Amend-
ment protection, so long as the facts themselves are not false 
or demeaning.62 
1. Overbreadth of the Local Rule 
The Ninth Circuit concurred with the district court's deter-
mination that a portion of Local Rule 2.5.2 is overbroad.63 The 
district court reasoned that the rule's prohibition against con-
duct "which impugns the integrity of the court" proscribes 
much constitutionally protected speech.54 The Ninth Circuit 
also affirmed the district court's holding that an attorney may 
be sanctioned for impugning the integrity of a court only if the 
rule can be given a limiting construction.65 
To save this portion of Rule 2.5.2, the district court read 
into it an "objective" version of the malice standard.66 This 
standard was originally set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.67 Relying on this "objective" 
standard, first applied by the Ninth Circuit in United States 
District Court v. Sandlin,68 the district court held Rule 2.5.2 
u.s. 1, 19 (1990»; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 (1977) which 
asserts that a statement of opinion is only actionable if it implies the existence of 
undisclosed defamatory facts. Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1438. 
61. Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1438. 
62. See id. at 1439; See also Lewis, 710 F.2d at 555. 
63. Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1436-37. 
64. [d. The court noted that the rule purports to punish even true statements 
that reflect poorly on the integrity of a judge. [d. 
65. [d.; Standing Comm. on Discipline of the U.S. Dist. Court for the Cent. 
Dist. of Cal. v. Yagman, 856 F. Supp. 1384, 1389 (C.D. Cal. 1994). The Ninth 
Circuit stated that a substantially overbroad restriction on protected speech is 
invalid unless it is "fairly subject to a limiting construction." Yagman, 55 F.3d at 
1437 (quoting Board of Airport Commr's v. Jews For Jesus Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 577 
(1987)). 
66. See Standing Comm., 856 F. Supp. at 1389-90. 
67. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). In Sullivan the Supreme Court held that a subjective 
standard would be used in defamation cases to determine whether the speaker 
acted with "actual malice", which is defined as having knowledge that his state-
ment was false or with reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of the statement. 
See Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1389-90. 
68. 12 F.3d 861 (9th Cir. 1993) (cited in Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1437). 
10
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to prohibit only false statements made with either knowledge 
of their falsity or statements made with reckless disregard as 
to their truth or falsity, as judged from the perspective of a 
"reasonable attorney.,,69 
Both the district court and the Ninth Circuit rejected 
Yagman's contention that the New York Times "subjective" 
malice standard should apply in attorney disciplinary proceed-
ings.70 Citing Sandlin, the Ninth Circuit noted that because 
the interests served in defamation actions are different from 
those served by the rules of professional ethics, the "objective 
standard" applies in attorney disciplinary proceedings.71 
The Ninth Circuit also outlined other First Amendment 
protections ordinarily applicable in defamation actions that are 
available to attorneys accused of making statements which 
impugn the integrity of a court.72 The court noted that truth 
is a defense to sanctions imposed for violating this rule.73 In 
addition, sanctionable statements must be capable of being 
proved true or false. 74 Thus, the First Amendment protects 
statements of opinion unless they "imply a false assertion of 
fact."75 Guided by these principles, the court determined 
69. Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1437 (citing Standing Comm., 856 F. Supp. at 1389-
90). Under this inquiry, the court must determine what a reasonable attorney 
would do in similar circumstances. Sandlin, 12 F.3d at 867. The inquiry focuses 
on whether the attorney possessed a reasonable factual basis for making the state-
ments, taking into account their nature and the context in which they were made. 
Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1437 (citing Sandlin, 12 F.3d at 867). 
70. See Standing Comm., 856 F. Supp. at 1390; see also Yagman, 55 F.3d at 
1437. 
71. See Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1437-38. Defamation seeks to remedy a private 
wrong to an individual's reputation by compensating that person. [d. at 1437. 
Unlike defamation law, ethical standards proscribing false statements which im-
pugn the integrity of a court are designed to maintain public confidence in the 
judicial system, rather than shield its judges from harsh criticism or compensate 
them in any way. [d. at 1438. In analyzing Sandlin, the Ninth Circuit in Yagman 
found that the objective standard maintained a constitutionally permissible balance 
between the right of attorneys to criticize judges and the public interest in pre-
serving confidence in the judicial system. [d. 
72. See id. at 1438. 
73. Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1438 (citing Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 
(1964)). In addition, the disciplinary body bears the burden of proving the state-
ment false. Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1438 (citing Philadelphia Newspapers Inc. v. 
Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776-77 (1986) and Oklahoma ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. 
Porter, 766 P.2d 958, 969 (Okla. 1988)). 
74. Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1438. 
75. [d. (citing Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 19 (1990); Lewis, 710 F.2d at 555; and 
11
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whether the statements attributed to Yagman impugned the 
integrity of the court. 
2. Accusation of Anti-Semitism 
The Ninth Circuit first considered Yagman's statement in 
the Daily Journal accusing Judge Keller of anti-Semitism.76 
Though the district court concluded that this statement was 
entirely an assertion of fact, the Ninth Circuit viewed it as 
both an assertion of fact and an expression of opinion.77 An 
opinion based on fully disclosed facts will be sanctioned only if 
the stated facts themselves are false and demeaning.78 Be-
cause the Committee did not claim that Yagman's factual as-
sertion was false, and because Yagman disclosed the basis for 
his view that Judge Keller is anti-Semitic, the Ninth Circuit 
found his remark to be protected by the First Amendment as 
an expression of opinion based on fully stated facts. 79 
3. Accusation of Dishonesty 
The Ninth Circuit disagreed with the district court's deter-
mination that Yagman's allegation of Judge Keller's "dishon-
esty" was sanctionable.80 For such a statement to be the sub-
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 (1977». The court also noted that state-
ments which cannot reasonably be interpreted as stating actual facts about their 
subject are not sanctionable, even though they might initially appear to be factual 
assertions. [d. (citing Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988). In 
Hustler the Supreme Court rejected a libel claim filed by a nationally known 
minister's against a magazine. The claim arose from the publication of an adver-
tisement "parody" which, among other things, portrayed the minister as having a 
drunken, incestuous encounter with his mother in a outhouse. Hustler, 485 U.S. 46 
(1988». The court affirmed a jury verdict which found that the parody could not 
reasonably be interpreted as stating actual facts about the minister. [d. at 57. 
76. Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1438. See also supra text accompanying note 16. 
77. Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1438. 
78. [d. at 1439 (citing Lewis, 710 F.2d 549, 555-56 and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS § 566, cmt. c). The court explained the rationale behind this rule: 
"When the facts forming the basis of an opinion are disclosed, the readers will 
understand that they are getting the author's interpretation of the facts and, 
therefore, will not likely assume the statement is based on additional, undisclosed 
facts." [d. at 1439 (citing Phantom Touring Inc. v. Affiliated Publications, 953 F.2d 
724, 730 (1st Cir. 1992) and Lewis, 710 F.2d at 555». 
79. Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1440. 
80. [d. at 1441. 
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ject of sanctions, it must first be capable of being proved true 
or false.81 The district court found that the statement "con-
tain[edl provably false factual connotations ... and plainly 
impl[ied] past improprieties."82 However, the Ninth Circuit 
held that, when considered in context with the other state-
ments, his remarks could only be understood as "rhetorical 
hyperbole.,,83 The Ninth Circuit found that, because Yagman's 
allegation of dishonesty did not imply facts capable of verifica-
tion, it was protected by the First Amendment as a statement 
of opinion.84 
4. Accusation Of Drunkenness 
The Ninth Circuit noted that, unlike the string of colorful 
terms Yagman used to describe Judge Keller in the Prentice 
Hall letter, the accusation that the judge was "drunk on the 
bench" was not protected as a statement of rhetorical hyperbo-
le because it implied facts capable of objective verification.85 
However, for the accusation to serve as a basis for sanctions, 
the Standing Committee was required to prove that the state-
ment was false, which it failed to do.86 Without proof of falsi-
ty, the court held that Yagman's accusation of drunkenness 
could not support a sanction for impugning the integrity of the 
court.87 
81. Id. at 1438 (citing Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 19). 
82. Standing Comm., 856 F. Supp. at 1391. 
83. Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1440. Yagman used a string of harsh terms to de-
scribe Judge Keller. See supra note 19. 
84. Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1441. Unlike the district court, the Ninth Circuit 
believed the accusation could not reasonably be interpreted as accusing Judge 
Keller of criminal misconduct. Id. at 1440. At most, the appellate court thought 
the accusation could be construed to imply that the judge was "intellectually dis-
honest," that is, Yagman might have been accusing Judge Keller of making rulings 
which were overly result-oriented. Id. at 1441. The court stated that such an alle-
gation of "intellectual dishonesty" could not be proved true or false by reference to 
a "core of objective evidence," and is thus not sanctionable. Id. (citing Milkovich, 
497 U.S. at 21). 
85. See id. at 1441. See supra note 19 for the text of the letter. The state-
ment was not part of the letter to Prentice Hall, but was a remark allegedly 
made to a newspaper reporter. Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1441. The court also found 
nothing that took away from the literal meaning of the words used by Yagman. 
Id. The court held that the statement could reasonably be interpreted to imply 
that Judge Keller had taken the bench at least once while he was intoxicated. Id. 
86. Id. The Ninth Circuit found that the district court improperly shifted the 
burden of proof on this issue to Yagman. Id. at 1441 n.21. 
87. Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1441-42 (citing Oklahoma ex rei. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n 
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C. CONDUCT WHICH INTERFERES WITH THE ADMINISTRATION 
OF JUSTICE 
The district court found that Yagman's statements inter-
fered with the administration of justice because they were 
made in an attempt to cause Judge Keller to recuse himself 
from cases in which Yagman appeared as counsel.88 In reach-
ing its conclusion, the district court focused on Yagman's intent 
in making the statements.89 However, the Ninth Circuit did 
not consider Yagman's intent to ''judge shop" sufficient to sup-
port a sanction.90 In reversing the sanction for interfering 
with the administration of justice the court instead focused on 
the likelihood that Yagman's conduct would actually prejudice 
the administration of justice, rather than on his purpose in 
making the statements.91 
1. A New Standard 
To determine whether the likelihood of Judge Keller's 
voluntary recusal was great enough to warrant sanctions, the 
Ninth Circuit had to decide what standard should be used to 
measure this probability.92 The court relied on the United 
States Supreme Court's decision in Gentile v. State Bar of 
Nevada93 to resolve this issue.94 Gentile held that speech oth-
erwise entitled to constitutional protection may be prohibited if 
it obstructs or prejudices the administration of justice.95 To 
determine the likelihood that an attorney's statements will 
prejudice a court proceeding, the Gentile Court rejected using a 
"clear and present danger standard."96 Instead, the Court 
chose a lower standard, holding that lawyers involved in pend-
ing cases may be punished if their statements pose a "substan-
v. Porter, 766 P.2d 958, 969 (Okla. 1988». 
88. See Standing Comm., 856 F. Supp. at 1392. 
89.Id. 
90. Id. at 1442-44. 
91. Id. at 1442. 
92. Id. at 1442-44. 
93. 501 U.S. 1030 (1991). 
94. Yagman, 55 F.3d 1442-43. 
95. Id. at 1442 (citing Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1074-75; see also Sheppard v. 
Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966». 
96. [d. at 1442 (citing Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1075). 
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tial likelihood" of materially prejudicing the fairness of the 
proceeding.97 
Although the Ninth Circuit examined the reasoning of 
Gentile in the present case, it found the special considerations 
present in Gentile to be of limited concern in Yagman's situa-
tion, since no case was pending before the court.98 Of these 
considerations, the Gentile Court focused most strongly on the 
"fair trial rights of litigants.'>99 As there was no case before 
the court and thus no jury venire to prejudice, such rights were 
of little concern in Yagman's case. lOO 
The Ninth Circuit also noted that speech restrictions not 
limited in duration by a particular trial may go far beyond 
postponing otherwise protected speech, as they may perma-
nently inhibit any criticism of judges, regardless of whether 
the criticism is true or false. lol Due to the absence of these 
considerations, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the "substan-
tial likelihood" standard would be unnecessarily restrictive in 
the present case. 102 Upon rejecting the "substantial likeli-
hood" test, the Ninth Circuit applied a new standard by hold-
ing that the "clear and present danger" test is applicable to 
attorney statements if no case is pending before the court. 103 
2. The "Clear and Present Danger" Standard 
Under the Ninth Circuit's new standard, an attorney's 
statements unrelated to a case pending before the court may 
only be sanctioned if they pose a clear and present danger to 
97.Id. 
98. Id. at 1443. 
99. Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1443 (citing Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1068). The Gentile 
court was particularly concerned with the effect of extrajudicial statements on 
potential jurors. Id. 
100. Id. at 1443. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. "Much speech of public importance - such as testimony at congressional 
hearings regarding the temperament and competence of judicial nominees - would 
be permanently chilled if the rule in Gentile were extended beyond the confines of 
the pending matter.n Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1443. 
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the court's administration of justice. 104 The Ninth Circuit not-
ed that even the probability of harm does not amount to a 
clear and present danger;105 the "substantive evil must be ex-
tremely serious and the degree of imminence must be extreme-
ly high before utterances can be punished."106 The court ob-
served that established precedent has held criticisms such as 
Yagman's to be insufficient to force the recusal of the judge at 
which it was aimed. 107 The majority noted: "Criticism from a 
party's attorney creates an even remoter danger that a judge 
will disqualify himself because the federal recusal statutes, in 
all but the most extreme circumstances, require a showing that 
the judge is (or appears to be) biased or prejudiced against a 
party, not counsel.,,108 The court also noted that public criti-
cism of judges is not uncommon and does not often lead to the 
judge's recusal. 109 Federal judges have been granted life ten-
ure to shield them from the pressure of such criticisms.110 
These factors led the Ninth Circuit to conclude that Yagman 
did not interfere with the administration of justice because any 
possibility that Yagman's statements would cause Judge Keller 
to recuse himself in future cases involving Yagman did not 
amount to a clear and present danger to the proper functioning 
of the courts. III Because his statements did not pose such a 
danger, Yagman could not be sanctioned for interfering with 
the administration of justice. 112 
104. Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1443. 
105. Id. at 1444 (citing Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 376 (1947)). 
106. Id. (quoting Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263 (1941». 
107. Id. 
108. Id. (citing United States v. Burt, 765 F.2d 1364, 1368 (9th Cir. 1985». See 
also In re Beard, 811 F.2d 818, 830 (4th Cir. 1987); Gilbert v. City of Little Rock, 
722 F.2d 1390, 1398-99 (8th Cir. 1983). Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1444. 
109. Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1444. The court also noted that Judge Real did not 
recuse himself in Yagman v. Republic Ins., 137 F.R.D. 652 (C.D. Cal. 1991), de-
spite being the target of harsh criticism by Yagman. Id. at 1444-45. 
110. Id. (citing In re Bernard, 31 F.3d 842, 846 n.8 (9th Cir. 1994)). 
111. Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1445. The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that after 
Yagman made the remarks at issue Judge Keller did recuse himself from a subse-
quent case in which Yagman was involved. Although the judge stated that his 
recusal was based on the fact that he had referred Yagman for discipline rather 
than Yagman's criticism itself, the court found the basis for recusal beside the 
point. Instead the majority's analysis "focuse[dl on objective probabilities: the ex-
tent to which the statements in question would be likely to cause a judge of aver-
age fortitude to disqualify himself." [d. at n.25. 
112. [d. 
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v. CRITIQUE 
The Ninth Circuit applied a new standard in Standing 
Committee v. Yagman 113 by holding that an attorney's state-
ments unrelated to a matter pending before the court may be 
punished only if they pose a clear and present danger to the 
administration of justice. 114 An examination of Yagman's past 
experiences concerning the recusal of judges before whom he 
has appeared casts doubt on whether the clear and present 
danger standard is low enough to prevent attorneys from im-
properly influencing the justice system. 115 
In September 1981, Yagman simultaneously filed five 
substantially similar complaints in the Central District of 
California and dismissed four of them within 73 minutes after 
they had been assigned to judges. lIS The Standing Committee 
pursued disciplinary action which was resolved by a stipulated 
settlement. ll7 The settlement provided that Yagman would be 
suspended from the practice of law for one month, pay a $500 
fine and perform twenty-five hours of pro bono service. 118 
Following the settlement, Yagman represented the plain-
tiff in a civil rights case before Judge Harry L. Hupp.1l9 Mer 
the jury rendered a verdict for the defense, Yagman immedi-
ately filed a new action charging the defendants and their 
lawyers with racketeering, mail fraud and obstruction of jus-
tice. 120 The action also alleged that Judge Hupp conspired 
with the defendants and their counsel to obstruct justice.121 A 
113. Standing Comm. on Discipline of the U.S. Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist. 
of Cal. v. Yagman, 55 F.3d 1430 (9th Cir. 1995). 
114. Id. at 1443 accord, In re Hinds, 449 A.2d 483, 498 (N.J. 1982). 
115. See Standing Comm. on Discipline of the U.S. Dist. Court for the Cent. 
Dist. of Cal. v. Yagman, 856 F. Supp. 1384, 1392-1394 (C.D. Cal. 1994) and infra 
text accompanying notes 121-33. 
116. Standing Comm., 856 F. Supp. at 1393. 
117. Id. The American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
prohibit filing frivolous or non-meritorious claims and contentions. See, e.g. MODEL 
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.1 (1994). 
118. Id. Yagman admitted he had committed acts in violation of Local Rule 2. 
Id. 
119. Id. 
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motion to dismiss was granted, but Judge Hupp recused him-
self from all post-trial proceedings and has since declined to 
hear any case in which Yagman represents a party.122 
In addition to Judge Hupp's recusal, approximately one 
year after the decision, the Ninth Circuit removed Chief Judge 
Manuel Real from a case involving Yagman.123 The appellate 
court issued the recusal order after Yagman criticized the 
judge and accused him of bias.124 Finally, the Ninth Circuit 
acknowledged that Judge Keller did disqualify himself from 
one of Yagman's cases after the criticisms in the present case 
were made. 125 
Given this history, it appears that under the clear and 
present danger standard, an attorney may still force the 
recusal of a judge, so long as the judge does not recuse himself 
immediately after the statement is made. 126 But even under 
the clear and present danger standard, Yagman's statements 
should be sanctionable, since in the cases involving Judge 
Real, Judge Hupp and even Judge Keller, Yagman's accusa-
tions either directly or indirectly forced their recusal from 
future proceedings. 127 Considering Yagman's record with the 
recusal of judges, it appears likely that his allegations of bias 
pose a clear and present danger to the administration of justice 
even if no matter is pending before the court. 128 
122. [d. (citing Hupp Declaration, September 20, 1993, at 2). 
123. [d. at 1393. 
124. [d. The circumstances of the removal are discussed in more detail in Facts 
and Procedural History. See supra text accompanying note 9. Yagman also issued 
a statement to the press which stated that the judge "consistently has been held 
in the lowest regard by virtually the entire legal community since he took the 
bench," and accused him of suffering from "mental disorders". Standing Comm., 
856 F. Supp. at 1394. 
125. Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1445 n.25. However, Judge Keller stated that his 
recusal was motivated by the fact that he had referred Yagman for disciplinary 
action. [d. 
126. See generally id. 
127. See id. at 1445; See also Standing Comm., 856 F. Supp. 1393-94. 
128. See Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1444-45 for the court's discussion of the clear and 
present danger standard as it applied to Yagman's statements. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
In Standing Committee v. Yagman/29 the Ninth Circuit 
held that an attorney's criticisms of a judge were statements of 
opinion which are protected by the First Amendment. 13o The 
court found that, taken together, Yagman's calling Judge Wil-
liam Keller a ''buffoon,'' a "sub-standard human" and "dishon-
est" can only be viewed as rhetorical hyperbole, and thus prove 
nothing more substantive than Yagman's contempt for the 
judge.131 However, the Ninth Circuit did not view his accusa-
tion of anti-Semitism as rhetorical hyperbole, but as an asser-
tion of both fact and opinion.132 The court held this assertion 
to be protected by the First Amendment because Yagman had 
stated the facts on which he based his opinion.133 Similarly, 
the Ninth Circuit did not view Yagman's accusation that Judge 
Keller was "drunk on the bench" as rhetorical hyperbole, be-
cause it implied facts capable of objective verification. l34 How-
ever, because the Standing Committee failed to prove the 
statement false, a sanction for "impugning the integrity of the 
court" could not stand. 135 
The Ninth Circuit also reversed a sanction for "interfering 
with the administration of justice."136 In reaching this conclu-
sion, the court announced a new application of an old stan-
dard: "[l]awyers' statements unrelated to a matter pending 
before the court may be sanctioned only if they pose a clear 
and present danger to the administration of justice.,,137 Ap-
129. Standing Comm. on Discipline of the U.S. Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist. 
of Cal. v. Yagman, 55 F.3d 1430 (9th Cir. 1995). 
130. See id. at 1437-42. 
131. [d. at 1440. 
132. [d. at 1438. 
133. [d. at 1440. 
134. Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1441. 
135. [d. at 1441-42. 
136. [d. at 1445. 
137. [d. at 1443. 
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plying this standard, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the 
probability of this danger occurring did not reach the level of 
"clear and present."138 Therefore, attorney sanctions were in-
appropriate. 139 
Jeffrey A. White· 
138. See id. at 1444. 
139. See Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1444-45. 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1997. 
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